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Although diversity is often thought to improve team performance by expanding 
the range of ideas available to the group, reported relationships between team diversity 
and performance have been somewhat weak (e.g., Bowers, Pharmer, & Salas, 2000; 
Devine & Philips, 2001; Webber & Donahue, 2001).  One possible explanation for the 
lack of findings on team diversity is that past research has largely taken an absolute (i.e., 
how much diversity) rather than a relative perspective (i.e., what pattern of diversity; Tsui 
& O’Reilly, 1989; Tsui, Egan, & O’Reilly, 1992).  Conceptually and operationally 
defining team diversity using faultlines – i.e., the pattern of how different types of 
demographic divisions either do or do not reinforce the salience of the subgroup – is one 
way to study diversity from a relative perspective. This thesis posits that the relative 
approach using faultlines may better elucidate the relationship between demography and 
team outcomes.  In particular, this thesis posits that the structural arrangement of 
diversity (i.e., faultlines) among team members gives rise to relational patterns of trust 
and coordination, which in turn determine team performance.  Results support the notion 








 Two changes impacting the modern organization are diversification and 
decentralization. Traditional organizational forms are built around hierarchy (i.e., 
centralization of power), which implies clarity, order, and differentiation.  In a 
hierarchical organization, there are clear demarcations in terms of who reports to whom 
(Krackhardt, 1994; Horner, 1997), and relationships are differentiated such that many 
individuals report to a fewer number of individuals in positions of power.  Modern 
organizations are becoming increasingly flatter, and decentralized (Daft, 2009).  
Practically speaking, such decentralized structures are resulting from the widespread use 
of teams as a basic unit of work accomplishment (e.g., Hempel, Zhang, & Han, 2009).  
Power is being delegated to groups of individuals who collectively manage their work 
processes and are jointly accountable for meeting objectives. 
The second change currently underway is the diversification of the workforce 
(Sawyer, Houlette, & Yeagley, 2006).  Just three decades ago, organizations were 
relatively demographically homogeneous by today’s standards (Robinson, Pfeffer, & 
Buccigrossi, 2003).  In the second half of the 20th century, organizations employed fewer 
women, racial and ethnic minorities, and older individuals than are employed today.  In 
the first half of the 21st century organizations will continue to diversify demographically, 
with white non-Hispanic individuals taking up a progressively smaller proportion the 
American workforce (Toossi, 2002).  This thesis considers the implications of the 




As organizational structures are becoming more team-based (Horner, 1997) and 
diversifying demographically (Murrell & James, 2001), as well as individuals within 
these organizations becoming increasingly aware of the importance of diversification 
(Scott, Heathcote, & Gruman, 2011), the question is: in what ways is diversification 
beneficial, and in what ways might it be detrimental?  The changes in structure and 
demography of organizations over the course of history have resulted in several classic 
findings related to team heterogeneity and homogeny.  For instance, the initial process 
and performance of demographically homogeneous teams surpasses that of 
heterogeneous teams, but over time diverse teams outperform homogeneous teams when 
recognizing problems and solutions to complex problems (Watson, Kumar, & 
Michaelsen, 1993), implying that diverse teams eventually gain a creative advantage over 
homogeneous teams.  However, although demographic variables implicitly seem an 
interesting predictor variable in an era of such rapid organizational diversification and 
change, the results have, in large part, been underwhelming.  Table 1 presents the effects 
sizes reported in past meta-analytic summaries of the effect of team composition on team 
performance. As you can see, these rho values range from -.24 to .40, with most falling 







Summary of Published Meta-Analyses Relating Team Composition/Diversity to Team Performance 
 










performance Fisher’s Z 
-1.13 No 
Personality -1.20 No 
Gender -.38 No 
Heterogeneity 1.27 No 
Devine & 
Philips, 2001 
16 Highest cognitive ability score 
Team 
performance 
r: mean sample-weighted 
correlation 
.21 No 
24 Cognitive ability mean .29 Yes 
9 Cognitive ability standard deviation -.03 No 
















13 Less job-related variables (age, gender, race/ethnicity) -.07 No 
24 











ρ: estimated true 
correlation, corrected for 
unreliability in predictor 
and criterion measures 
and range restriction 
.04 No 
9 Agreeableness .25 Yes 
10 Conscientiousness .21 Yes 
9 Emotional stability .04 No 






Table 1 continued 
 
Summary of Published Meta-Analyses Relating Team Composition/Diversity to Team Performance 
 







6 Extraversion variability 
Team 
performance 
ρ: estimated true 
correlation, corrected for 
unreliability in predictor 
and criterion measures 
.06 No 
6 Agreeableness variability -.12 Yes 
6 Conscientiousness variability -.24 Yes 
6 Emotional stability variability .02 No 





(personality, cognitive ability, 
expertise) 
Team 
performance ρ: estimated true validity 
.27 Yes 
20 Personality .26 Yes 
10 Cognitive ability .40 Yes 
14 Expertise .16 Yes 
26 Heterogeneity -.04 No 





ρ: corrected population 
correlation 
.11 Yes 
29 Agreeableness .12 Yes 
38 Extraversion .09 Yes 
22 Emotional stability .04 No 
25 Openness to experience .05 No 
14 Collectivism .25 Yes 





Table 1 continued 
 
Summary of Published Meta-Analyses Relating Team Composition/Diversity to Team Performance 
 






15 Task-related diversity Team 
performance 
quality ρ: weighted mean effect 
size 
.13 Yes 
14 Bio-demographic diversity -.01 No 









31 Functional background 
Team 
performance 
ρ: corrected population 
correlation 
.10 Yes 
13 Educational background variety .01 No 
9 Education level mean .01 No 
17 Organizational tenure mean .08 Yes 
15 Team tenure mean .09 No 
31 Race -.11 Yes 
38 Sex -.06 Yes 










50 Supervisory ratings -.14 No 







Perhaps the true impact of diversity is somehow being masked.  Relational 
demography is an area of research that seeks to use a group’s relative rather than absolute 
demographic variables to predict outcomes; it is “the comparative demographic 
characteristics of members of dyads or groups who are in a position to engage in regular 
interactions” (Tsui & O’Reilly, 1989, p. 403).  Thus, relational demography is a context-
sensitive approach to looking at the effect of attribute variables on team-level outcomes.  
For example, it is not just about the effect of gender or race per se, but how said variables 
affect outcomes depending on the individual in comparison to the rest of the group.  
Classic research focusing on relative rather than absolute demographic predictors found 
that individuals who are demographically disparate from the other individuals in their 
team are less committed to their organization, more likely to be absent, and more likely to 
leave the organization (Tsui, Egan, & O’Reilly, 1992).  Similar research has found that in 
terms of performance and attractiveness supervisors rate subordinates that are 
demographically dissimilar to themselves lower than they rate demographically similar 
subordinates, and individuals with demographically dissimilar superiors experienced 
greater role ambiguity than those with demographically similar superiors (Tsui & 
O’Reilly, 1989).   
A related area of study is faultline research, which explores the existence and 
strength of factions between groups as predictor variables.  Like in traditional relational 
demography research, faultline researchers conceptualize individuals attribute variables 
as context dependent; however, faultline research looks at the intersection of two or more 
attribute variables in a group context, and whether subgroups are made salient based on 




research can easily be linked to high profile current events involving diverse groups of 
people in the United States.  For instance, recently students at University of California, 
Berkeley, demonstrated against the school’s affirmative action policies in the form of a 
bake sale protest; baked goods cost $2.00 for White students, $1.50 for Asian students, 
$1.00 for Latino students, $0.75 for Black students, and $0.25 for Native American 
students, with all females getting a $0.25 discount (Curry, Dolak, & Katrandjian, 2011).  
The consequence of demonstrations such as this may be emphasizing group differences 
and the creation of factions (e.g., James, Brief, Dietz, & Cohen, 2001; Brief et al., 2005); 
in other words, events such as this make demographic faultlines highly salient.  This has 
implications for conflict and reduced trust between groups (Li & Hambrick, 2005). 
 The overall relationships that have been reported between diversity and 
performance are weak; however, this is potentially inaccurate because previous studies 
have had an absolute rather than a relative perspective on diversity.  In situations where 
traditional demographic variables are not strong predictors, the relational, faultline 
perspective may be able to elucidate the relationship between demography and team 
outcomes.  For instance, say that a researcher is trying to predict team coordination, and 
finds neither age nor gender to be a significant predictor.  This individual may find—
using the same data—that from a relative rather than absolute perspective age and gender 
do indeed have an impact on coordination.  So, this person might conclude that while age 
and gender do not predict coordination scores, looking at the constructs in a relative 
manner, and in conjunction, proves a more fruitful approach.  Thus, the current study 
aims to look at how group structure along multiple dimensions of diversity, namely 




coordination in turn impact performance.  Additionally, the current research aims to use a 
combination of traditional psychometric and social network methodologies to address 
these questions.   
Faultlines 
“Faultlines divide a group’s members on the basis of one or more attributes.  For 
instance, gender faultlines divide groups into male and female subgroups…[F]aultlines 
become stronger as more attributes align themselves in the same way” (Lau & 
Murnighan, 1998, p. 325-340).  Faultlines capture the extent to which subgroups form 
based on multiple types of differences, and are one way of capturing the relative rather 
than absolute demography of a team.  For example, consider a team of four people 
consisting of three Asian-American men from New York City and three African-
American women from Los Angeles.  This team exemplifies a very strong faultline, 
based on three variables; the race, gender, and hometown of these individuals. The 
faultline is strong because the subgroups formed by each of these demographic variables 
align perfectly.  Faultlines are often researched in the context of team conflict.  
Analogous geographic fault lines, which are surface traces of deep faults in the surface of 
the Earth and are predictive of where earthquakes are going to occur, social faultlines are 
hypothetically indicative of deeper social patterns of relations that will cause a group 
under pressure to rupture (Hart & Van Vugt, 2006).  Methodologically, faultlines have 
been shown to be a stronger predictor than single-attribute heterogeneity indices for a 
variety of different team-level outcomes, such as expected performance (Lau & 
Murnighan, 2005). 




member differences, and they fall into two basic classes.  Social category faultlines occur 
with regards to social category demographic variables of group members such as race, 
sex, or age.  Contrastingly, information-based faultlines occur based on differences in 
job-related attributes of members, such as general mental ability or psychological 
collectivism (e.g., Thatcher & Patel, in press).  Thus, it is possible to conceptualize the 
construct of faultlines as two distinct classes.  However, it should be noted that some 
variables that create faultlines in groups are difficult to taxonomize in either of the two 
classes, such as geographic distribution, which is often confounded with nationality (e.g., 
Polzer, Crisp, Jarvenpaa, & Kim, 2006).  In addition, the majority of previous research on 
faultlines has focused on social faultlines (Thatcher & Patel, 2011), perhaps because they 
are readily detectable.  To expand, faultlines can be defined based on both surface- and 
deep-level characteristics (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998).  Surface level characteristics 
are either those that are relatively visible/considered to be visible to the eye (e.g., age or 
race) or those that are common knowledge to members of a group (e.g., functional 
background or organizational tenure).  On the other hand, deep-level characteristics are 
not apparent about individuals, and take time in order to determine; for instance, it takes 
some degree of time, effort, and communication to ascertain an individual’s attitudes, 
personality, and/or values (Mohammed & Angell, 2004).  
Additionally, in different situations faultlines can either be activated or dormant.  
While both activated and dormant faultlines are based on demographic characteristics, 
activated faultlines are actually perceived by individuals.  Restated, a faultline becomes 
activated when something triggers an increase in the salience of relevant social identities, 




2009).  Groups with activated faultlines have been shown to be more likely to form 
coalitions and to have higher levels of group conflict, lower levels of satisfaction, and 
decreased group performance in contrast with groups with dormant faultlines (Jehn & 
Bezrukova, 2010). 
Measuring Faultlines 
Theoretically, faultline strength is how clear (or unclear) the division between 
subgroups within a group is, based on differences in social and informational 
categorization/identification.  Methodologically, faultlines are captured by identifying 
social and informational categories and by grouping individuals into said categories.  
Then, faultline strength can be estimated by calculating the ratio of the between-group 
sum of squares to the total sum of squares, which reflects the amount of variation in 
overall group characteristics accounted for by the strongest group split (Thatcher, Jehn, & 
Zanutto, 2003).  Detailed formulae for calculating faultline strength are presented in 
Table 2.  Thus, what is important in the calculation of faultlines is not differences 
between groups, or even the relative difference within the team, but rather the pattern of 
how differences along one attribute align with differences along another attribute; when 
subgroups within the team are based on multiple attributes, they are more salient and 














































Correlates of Faultlines 
An abundance of past research has found relations between faultlines (or faultline 
strength) and critical outcome variables for teams, such as performance; already, an 
abundance of research has indicated that faultlines are negatively associated with team 
performance (e.g., Homan, van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007).  For 
instance, teams with activated gender faultlines tend to be less prolific and less creative 
(Pearsall, Ellis, & Evans, 2008), and teams with large demographic faultlines tend to 
experience more task and relational conflict, as well as behavioral disintegration, all of 
which lead to diminished performance (Li & Hambrick, 2005).  Similarly, conflict has 
been shown to mediate the relation between demographic faultlines and both group 
organizational citizenship behaviors and performance (Choi & Sy, 2010); thus, faultlines 
reliably lead to team conflict, which in turn leads to diminished performance.  Yet, 
although research has suggested that social category faultlines are negatively related to 
performance, there is no evidence of such a relation for information-based faultlines 
(Bezrukova, Jehn, Zanutto, & Thatcher, 2009).  In addition to being negatively related to 
performance, meta-analytic results have indicated that demographic faultlines are 
negatively related to team satisfaction and cohesion and positively related to both task 
and relationship conflict (Thatcher & Patel, 2011).  However, research has also 
demonstrated no relation between faultlines and performance when shared objectives are 
high (van Knippenberg, Dawson, West, & Homan, 2011). 
Some research findings have indicated that faultlines have a curvilinear impact on 
outcomes, meaning that the processes and performance of teams with the weakest and 




faultlines (Mannix & Neale, 2005).  For instance, a curvilinear relationship has been 
suggested between faultlines and relationship and process conflict, morale, and 
performance (Thatcher, Jehn, & Zanutto, 2003).  Similar research has found a curvilinear 
relation between constructs such as age heterogeneity (Richard & Shelor, 2002) and 
performance.  However, this hypothesis has yet to be tested; most research reports linear 
relations between faultlines and outcome variables (Thatcher & Patel, 2011).  This thesis 
considers two important aspects of team functioning likely to be impacted by faultlines: 
trust and coordination. 
Trust  
Trust is “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability 
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau, 
Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395).  Demographically, individuals tend to trust those 
that they consider to be similar others, and conversely are more likely to distrust those 
that they perceive as dissimilar (Li & Hambrick, 2005).  This finding is linked 
theoretically to faultline theory because the perception of faultlines within a group should 
engender feelings of mistrust.  Although strong faultlines don’t increase the diversity of 
the team, the patterning or alignment in differences that occurs when there are strong 
faultlines makes existing differences more salient, thereby increasing the frequency of 
“us versus them” social comparisons (Thatcher & Patel, 2011).  Indeed, informational 
faultlines—specifically, geographic faultlines in distributed teams—have been found to 
lead to increased levels of conflict and decreased levels of trust (Polzer, Crisp, Jarvenpaa, 
& Kim, 2006).  Conversely, dyads with shared characteristics in teams with strong 




characteristics (Wiggins, 2009).  
Coordination 
Coordination is “the process of orchestrating the sequence and timing of 
interdependent actions” (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001, p. 367-368); at the multiteam 
system level coordination is “aligning and sequencing and timing of interdependent 
action” (DeChurch & Marks, 2006).  Perceived faultlines in teams have been shown to 
reduce knowledge coordination, a crucial antecedent of performance, and knowledge 
coordination has been shown to fully mediate the effect of perceived faultlines on 
performance, in distributed teams (Shen, Gallivan, & Tang, 2008).  So, when individuals 
perceive a faultline dividing their team into subgroups, they are less likely to coordinate 
across that faultline, and subsequently their performance is reduced.  Additionally, 
communication is a form of explicit coordination (Fiore, Salas, Cuevas, & Bowers, 
2003), as stated previously, and is also an important consequence of faultlines.  For 
instance, when compared to demographically dissimilar individuals, demographically 
similar individuals have been shown to engage in increased levels of communication, 
when compared to demographically dissimilar individuals.  It follows that the formation 
of smaller factions within a larger group not only impedes general group functioning but 
also, more specifically, encumbers verbal communications (Lau & Murnighan, 1998).   
Teams as Networks 
Traditionally defined, a team is "a distinguishable set of two or more people who 
interact dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively toward a common and valued 
goal/object/mission, who have each been assigned specific roles or functions to perform, 




Tannenbaum, 1992, p. 4).  Teams inherently involve human social interaction; even 
virtual—or distributed—teams involve interactions, albeit with the assistance of 
technology.  The study of social networks focuses on better understanding complex 
relationships, or ties, between individuals, or actors, in order to predict human behavior.  
Thus, the intrinsically social nature of teams allows them to be conceptualized as 
networks.  Specifically, from a networks perspective a group/team is defined in one of 
two ways: either as fully connected—or at least almost fully connected—actors within a 
population, or as an exogenously-determined categorization of individuals (Katz, Lazer, 
Arrow, & Contractor, 2004).  Actors, which are also called nodes, can represent a variety 
of variables, including people, organizations, and concepts (Borgatti & Foster, 2003).  
However, for the purposes of team-based research, networks in which actors are 
individuals are the most relevant.  
 There are a wide variety of ties that connect actors in networks. Ties can connect 
actors who are all of the same type, for example, ties among individuals in teams. Ties 
can also describe the relationships among multiple types of actors (i.e., bipartite 
networks; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005), for example, ties between people and teams where 
linkages occur when individuals are members of the same team. In addition, ties can be 
defined in terms of their content. Commonly studied team ties include communication, or 
which individuals speak to or message one another affective ties, such as trust or love 
ties, material/work flow ties, such as which individual gives money to which other 
individual, and cognition, such as which actors know or do not know one another.  The 
ties in a network can be directed or undirected. Directed networks carry meaning in the 




trust which other actors.  Undirected networks describe relations among actors when the 
direction is not meaningful.  Undirected networks include friendship (i.e., as 
operationalized on Facebook), sexual intercourse, or prior affiliation on the same team.  
The ties in a network can also describe the intensity or strength of relations among actors.  
For example, communication networks can capture the frequency communication.  
An advantage of the addition of the network approach to studying teams is that it 
facilitates the study of phenomena that are distinct at different levels of analysis.  The tie 
structure of a network can reflect relations at various levels of analysis: for instance, 
dyadic, triadic, and group-level relations can be assessed through looking at reciprocity, 
transitivity, and density, respectively.  Thus, using network analytic methods, the most 
appropriate level of analysis can be chosen for the research question at hand. 
Emergent States 
 The network approach provides a valuable way to examine compilational 
emergence in teams. The content of the ties among individuals is used to capture 
emergent states and processes.  Emergent states are “the conditions that dynamically 
enable and underlie effective teamwork” (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010, p. 33).  
They evolve in a team based on interactive processes (Jehn, Greer, Levine, & Szulanski, 
2008), and are motivational, cognitive, or affective in nature.  Team processes impact 
emergent states, and emergent states link inputs and processes with outcomes (Mathieu, 
Gilson, & Ruddy, 2006); an example of an emergent state is trust.  Contrastingly, 
emergent processes relate to teammate interaction and behavioral synchronization 
(DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010), and an example is coordination.  The current 




functioning.  For instance, previous research has indicated that trust is a deciding factor in 
the formation of team cognition (Rico, Sanchez-Manzanares, Gil, & Gibson, 2008), and 
has a strong impact on team members’ attitudes toward the organization, perceived 
performance, satisfaction, and continuance and attitudinal commitment (Costa, 2003); 
trust is a sort of fundamental glue that maintains the cohesion of a team.  Coordination is 
just as imperative for a team to succeed.  Especially in today’s world of virtual, 
distributed teams, the ability to coordinate and communicate effectively is not trivial.  
Accordingly, coordination is closely related to team performance (Massey, Montoya-
Weiss, & Hung, 2003). 
Trust 
The emergence of trust, or team members allowing themselves to be vulnerable to 
one another, enhances information sharing and synergy, and thus increases overall team 
effectiveness (Curşeu & Schruijer, 2010).  Research has indicated that trust enhances 
team member viability, and conflict can diminish perceptions of trust within a team (Jehn 
et al., 2008).  In particular, trust mediates the relation between conflict and performance, 
partially for task conflict and fully for relationship conflict.  Also, trust is less impacted 
by task conflict when team members are highly cognitively synchronized, and less 
affected by relationship conflict when team members are highly connected in terms of the 
task at hand (Rispens, Greer, & Jehn, 2007).  Previous research has also found that trust 
is closely related to the social identities of the group members.  For instance, in situations 
of low identity threat—when individuals do not feel that they will be evaluated 
negatively based on their group membership—trust can be created in demographically 




that imposing a common in-group identity in a heterogeneous team can lead to increased 
levels of trust (van der Zee, Vos, & Luijters, 2009). 
In addition, research on internationally distributed teams has indicated that the 
same norms that reinforce social interactions also enhance trust, including: 
acknowledging of individual member contributes, exchanging personal information, 
motivating one another, providing positive feedback, and exchanging opinions (Koelher, 
2004).  Furthermore, trust in virtual teams has been shown to emerge more as a cognitive 
and less as an affective state (Kanawattanachai & Yoo, 2002; Iacono & Weisband, 1997).  
Additionally, although both low- and high-performing virtual teams have around the 
same levels of cognitive and affective trust early in their lifespans, high-performing 
teams are singularly able to cultivate and sustain trust throughout time (Kanawattanachai 
& Yoo, 2002). 
Coordination 
Coordination is an emergent process, of which there are two principal types.  
Explicit coordination, which is the more commonly studied of the two, includes team-
level behaviors such as communication and planning, while “[i]mplicit coordination takes 
place when team members anticipate the actions and needs of their colleagues and task 
demands and dynamically adjust their own behavior accordingly, without having to 
communicate directly with each other or plan the activity” (Rico, Sánchez-Manzanares, 
Gil, & Gibson, 2008, p. 164).  Team coordination can be effectively achieved on a long 
term basis through team norms being internalized and high internal sanctions, such as 
feelings of guilt related to lack of coordination, being in place (Antonetti & Rufini, 




Coordination is particularly important in project teams because it allows team 
members to become organized and work efficiently toward a common goal.  Project 
teams members most often need to coordinate with one another due to task 
interdependencies or changes occurring in the project development process (Hoegl, 
Weinkauf, & Gemuenden, 2004).  Both collocated and distributed teams make 
coordination efforts; namely, communication amongst team members tends to be the 
primary form of coordination in both situations.  However, distributed teams have the 
added challenge of having to coordinate their communication efforts, oftentimes using 
virtual tools (Massey, Montoya-Weiss, & Hung, 2003). 
Communication 
As aforementioned, communication is a type of explicit coordination, and is 
generally associated with positive outcomes.  For instance, research on geographically 
distributed teams has shown that spontaneous communication is associated with 
individuals sharing an identity and/or context, and spontaneous communication also has 
been shown to mitigate the effect of geographic distribution on conflict (Hinds & 
Mortensen, 2005).  Moreover, additional recent research on distributed teams has found 
that the medium of communication impacts the content of what is imparted.  For 
example, meta-analytic research has shown that when communicating using virtual 
means, the uniqueness of information shared is enhanced, but the openness of 
information sharing is reduced (Mesmer-Magnus, DeChurch, Jimenez-Rodriguez, 
Wildman, & Shuffler, 2011).  In fact, it has been suggested that geographically 
distributed teams experience more salient faultlines than collocated teams (Ryan, 2010), a 




Mortensen’s (2005) finding can be understood from a faultline lens: groups with 
members that vary in terms of location and/or identity tend to experience a faultline rift, 
and this is reflected through spontaneous communication patterns. 
The Relation Between Trust and Communication 
 Trust and communication are not mutually exclusive constructs; on the contrary, 
the two commonly co-occur and recent research has suggested that the variables are 
causally related to one another.  In relation to communication, trust has been 
conceptualized as both an antecedent and a consequent in previous literature (e.g., 
Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999; Jarvenpaa, Shaw, & Staples, 2004).  This phenomenon of co-
occurrence can also be understood as attitude-behavior consistency (Borgida & 
Campbell, 1982).  
Theoretically, it has been suggested that coordination is accomplished in virtual 
teams through trust and open communication (Jarvenpaa, Knoll, & Leidner, 1998).  This 
theory has been empirically supported through research on distributed teams; for 
instance, the results of a study using multiplayer online role-playing games indicated that 
while trust positively impact success, low levels of trust can lead to problems stemming 
from lack of coordination (Chen, 2009).  Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer (1996) theorized 
that trust in temporary teams develops at a much “swifter” pace than that of a more 
permanent group.  Indeed, research has shown that in virtual teams, which are often 
temporary, both the frequency and volume of task-oriented communications between 
teammates impacts the initial development of cognition-based trust (Kanawattanachai & 
Yoo, 2007).  Moreover, although these teams tend to establish trust very quickly initially, 




the formation of more stable trust relations in distributed teams, while irregular or 
unpredictable communication behaviors can hinder the development of trust (Jarvenpaa 
& Leidner, 1999).  Co-occurring high levels of trust and communication are also related 
to increased team performance (Iacono & Weisband, 1997).  Later in a virtual team’s 
lifespan, it has been found that trust moderates the relation between team communication 
and members’ attitudes and perceptions of task quality (Jarvenpaa, Shaw, & Staples, 
2004). 
Dyadic Processes in Teams 
Reciprocal relations between human beings are truly some of the most critical 
underpinnings of our dynamic social worlds.  “The norm of reciprocation—the rule that 
obliges us to repay other for what we have received from them—is one of the strongest 
and most pervasive [human] social forces…[Reciprocity] helps us build trust with others 
and pushes us toward equity in our relationships” (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004, p. 599).  
For instance, when an individual becomes ill or disabled, her subjective well-being 
declines.  The mechanism for this decline is thought to be due, in large part, to social 
circumstances surrounding the impairment—if the individual is rendered less able to 
reciprocate social support to others, then the quality of her relationships may suffer 
(Pinquart & Sörensen, 2000).  In a similar vein, it has been posited that communication 
reciprocity is a critical factor in differentiating mentally ill from mentally healthy 
individuals; individuals that are unable to reciprocate communications to other tend to be 
afflicted with some sort of mental illness, essentially (Albrecht & Adelman, 1984).  In 
addition, it has been found that an individual is 171% more likely to become obese if an 




individuals that do not reciprocate friendship, spouses, siblings, and neighbors (Christakis 
& Fowler, 2007).  Furthermore, norms of reciprocity often guide workplace behaviors, 
but individuals tend to engage in reciprocation to different degrees, depending on who the 
target of the interaction is (Settoon, Bennett, & Liden, 1996).  Thus, reciprocal social ties 
with others are critical to our happiness but can also have detrimental impacts to our 
health and welfare, and reciprocation is not only a behavior but also a guiding force in 
everyday life.  Reciprocity is especially relevant when considering trust and coordination 
relations because of the unique implications associated with unidirectional 
trust/coordination ties. 
Faultlines and Dyadic Processes 
In groups with strong faultlines, there is a clear divide between subgroups based 
on two or more attributes (Thatcher, Jehn, & Zanutto, 2003); thus, although faultlines 
take a toll on group processes and performance (Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010; Thatcher & 
Patel, 2011; Thatcher & Patel, 2012), the homogenous subgroups created by faultlines 
may be more prone to trust (Williams, 2001) and coordinate with individuals within their 
subgroup (Bowers, Pharmer, & Salas, 2000), with similar others.  This phenomenon can 
best be explained by the principle of homophily.  People tend to come in contact more 
with similar than dissimilar people, and thus information tends to be localized in certain 
ways based on a network’s social characteristics (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 
2001).  A theory that expands on the concept of homophily is intergroup bias, which 
states that individuals tend to trust, cooperate with, empathize with, and generally 
positively regard/evaluate their in-groups, or groups in which they are members, more 




Willis, 2002).  So, people will spend more time with similar others, and will had higher 
levels of positive affect toward these in-group members as well.  Furthermore, the 
similarity-attraction paradigm states that demographic similarity leads between 
individuals leads to perceived similarity of attitudes and values, which in turn leads to 
interpersonal attraction (Graves & Powell, 1995).  So, a dyad that shared the same race or 
gender will have an initial positive bias toward each other.  This theory also posits that 
individuals will communicate more with similar others, and will apply negative 
assumptions to dissimilar others (Jehn, Bezrukova, & Thatcher, 2008).  All of these 
theories stand to explain why subgroups of individuals with similar characteristics would 
stand to trust and coordinate more with one another than they would with individuals 
outside their subgroup.   
In addition, social categorization theory (Tajfel, 1982) can be used to explain why 
subgroup members trust and coordinate more with each other than with members of out-
groups.  This theory posits that individuals cognitively organize their social world based 
on observed similarities and differences between individuals.  Individuals will tend to 
view in-groups as highly heterogeneous and out-groups as highly homogeneous.  Thus, 
people tend to dehumanize out-group members, and value in-group members, and this 
pattern of discrimination will affect affective (e.g., trust) and behavioral reactions (e.g., 
coordination) states when interacting with in-groups and out-groups.  Therefore, based on 
previous research and theory, it is hypothesized that: 
Hypotheses 1 and 2: Social (H1) and informational (H2) faultline strength 
will positively predict subgroup trust (H1a, H2a) and coordination (H1b, 




 Research has demonstrated that demographic individual differences progressively 
have less of an impact on group social processes, while informational individual 
differences increasingly matter more (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998).  This finding makes 
sense intuitively; when first introduced to a group of people, one can usually visually 
determine their social identities, with few exceptions (e.g., sexual identity, certain 
disabilities, etc., are invisible).  Thus, social categorizations occur from the moment that 
the group assembles, while informational variables are oftentimes not visible (e.g., 
personality traits, tenure; Jehn, Bezrukova, & Thatcher, 1998), and thus take time to 
discover about others.  Sawyer, Houlette, and Yeagley (2006) proposed time as a 
moderator of surface- versus deep-level diversity, stating that: “Deep level diversity 
relates to those attributes of the individual such as attitudes, beliefs and values that take 
time to emerge from interpersonal interaction” (p. 2).  However, as time passes, 
information regarding individuals’ deep-level characteristics is acquired, and takes the 
place of social characteristic information in terms of mediating social processes. 
Accordingly, it can be posited, based on previous research, that demographic and 
informational faultlines will follow a similar trend in terms of their impact on dyadic 
level group processes—namely, reciprocal trust and coordination/communication: 
Hypothesis 3: Social faultline strength will positively predict early 
subgroup trust (H3a) and coordination (H3b) reciprocity more strongly 
than will informational faultline strength, while informational faultline 
strength will positively predict later subgroup trust (H3c) and 





Dyadic Processes and Performance 
Trust, an affective understanding that a particular individual will not exploit one’s 
vulnerabilities, is critical for teamwork because it allows for effective cooperation and 
collaboration.  If members of a team have doubts each other’s trustworthiness, or feel like 
certain individuals on the team might indeed exploit the vulnerabilities of other members, 
the team will be less able to cooperate, collaborate, and coordinate, and thus will be less 
effective (e.g., Sabel, 1993; Simons & Peterson, 2000, Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 
1998).  Previous literature has demonstrated that trust in teams reliably predicts a number 
of important, team-relevant outcomes, such as positively predicting attitudes toward the 
organization, attitudinal commitment, team performance, and team satisfaction, and 
negatively predicting continuance commitment—or the motivation to remain with an 
organization for calculated reasons (e.g., financial reasons; Costa, 2003).  Similarly, 
coordination has also been positively related to team performance in previous literature 
(Tsai, 2002).  Because teamwork virtually always involves some sort of shared task, it is 
critical that team members successfully interact with and rely information to one another 
in order to accomplish their common goal.  Without the ability to coordinate, teams 
would not be able to transition and act effectively.  Coordination is an especially critical 
emergent state in action teams, where the consequences of lacking it could even be fatal; 
for instance, a behavioral that surgical teams are assessed on is their coordination 
processes (Healey, Undre, & Vincent, 2004).  
However, although high levels of trust and coordination usually lead to increased 
performance, there are group structures that can diminish and even reverse that effect.  To 




formation of subgroups based on demographic faultlines), those smaller groups will 
likely experience less conflict.  However, the divided team, taken as a whole, is more 
likely to experience an “us-versus-them” mentality,” as well as increased conflict, 
increased distrust, and decreased trust (Thatcher & Patel, 2011), which are negative 
correlates of team performance.  Thus, based on aforementioned research and theory, is it 
posited that: 
Hypothesis 4: Subgroup trust (H4a) and coordination (H4b) reciprocity 
will negatively predict team performance. 
Trust & Coordination as Mediators 
 Furthermore, I expect trust and coordination reciprocity to mediate the relation 
between faultline strength and team performance.  Restated, trust and coordination 
reciprocity will be the mechanisms by which faultline strength impacts team 
performance.  As explicated previously, Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict positive relations 
between social and informational faultline strength and subgroup trust and coordination 
reciprocity; as faultline strength increases, or as subgroup homogeneity increases, so too 
will the tendency for individuals to reciprocate trust and coordination ties within their 
subgroups.  Moreover, Hypothesis 4 posits a negative relation between subgroup trust 
and coordination reciprocity—the criterion variables from Hypotheses 1 and 2 —and 
team performance; the formation of coalitions, as indicated by high levels of within-
subgroup reciprocity, will negatively impact team-level performance.  Taken together, 
these hypotheses specify a causal network in which subgroup trust and coordination 
reciprocity fully mediate the relations between social and informational faultline strength 




only affect performance via their relations with trust and coordination reciprocity, and not 
directly.  The model specifies full rather than partial mediation because I expect 
subgroup-level reciprocity to account entirely for the relation between faultline strength 
and team performance, meaning that the relation between faultline strength and team 
performance should be null when reciprocity is included in the model.  Accordingly, it is 
put forth that: 
Hypothesis 5:  Subgroup trust (H5a) and coordination (H5b) reciprocity 
will mediate the relation between social faultline strength and team 
performance. 
Hypothesis 6:  Subgroup trust (H6a) and coordination (H6b) reciprocity 










Figure 1.  Theoretical model of the relation between faultline strength, trust and 






Intersection of Faultline and Network Theory 
 Surprisingly, the intersection of faultline and network theory has been fairly 
limited to date.  Only a small number of studies have truly united the two literatures (e.g., 
Lawrence, 2006; Ryan, 2007; Trezzini, 2008; Balkundi, Kilduff, Barsness, & Michael, 
2006).  One such study looked at the effect of faultlines on team processes and 
performance, and found that performance improved when friendship ties cut across 
cultural faultline subgroups, but relationship conflict increased and performance suffered 
when animosity ties cut across cultural faultline subgroups (Ren, 2008). 
 Theoretically, it has been a fairly common suggestion to combine faultline and 
network theory.  For instance, it has been proposed that induced homophily, which arises 
as a consequence of the homogeneity of structural opportunities for interaction (Kossinets 
& Watts, 2009), may explain faultline splits (Lawrence, 2006).  In addition, internal 
boundary spanning has been conceptualized as being defined by the activities that bridge 
faultlines (Ryan, 2007), and structural holes have been hypothesized to indicate faultlines 
(Balkundi, Kilduff, Barsness, & Michael, 2006). 
 There are a number of other rationales for why faultline and network theory 
should be united.  For example, network analysis is particularly useful when analyzing 
networks with two clearly defined cliques (Espinosa, Cummings, Wilson, & Pearce, 
2003); in other words, it is robust in the situation of a group with one clearly defined 
faultline.  Moreover, the theories are compatible in terms of the ideas that they purport.  
Both theories emphasize contextual factors; faultline theory applies social identity and 




context of the specific network being studied.  Additionally, homophily and heterophobia 







These ideas were tested in a sample of 226 student participants organized into 27 
teams to perform a semester-long class project.  The original sample contained 268 
participants organized into 32 teams, but due to the fact that faultline scores have to be 
calculated with complete demographic data (i.e., gender, age, narcissism, and 
psychological collectivism), 5 teams were excluded from analyses because of missing 
data.  Specifically, the entire dataset was left with 9 missing values from 5 teams.  Of 
these values, 88.89% (or, 8 pieces) were missing from French management students.  
Each individual with a missing value for narcissism was also missing a value for 
psychological collectivism; so, in other words, the dataset lacked psychometric data for 4 
French students.  The 5 teams with missing data were excluded from analyses, leaving 
the final sample of 27 teams.  Little’s (1988) Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) 
test was carried out to verify that missing values in the dataset are independent of 
measured variables as well as unobservable parameters.  The resulting test statistic, 
displayed in Table 3, was not significant, meaning the data are indeed missing completely 
at random.  When data are missing completely at random, this means that the probability 
that any given observation is missing is unrelated to the value of that observation or to 
any other variable.  Alternatively, data can be missing at random (MAR) or missing not 
at random (MNAR).  If data are missing at random, this means that the probability that 
any given observation is missing is unrelated to the value of that observation but is 




capable of being classified as either MCAR or MAR, and their missingness is 








Results of Little’s Missing Completely at Random Test 
 
Variables Included in Model χ² df p value 




5. Narcissism (mean) 
6. Psychological collectivism (mean) 









Ecology and psychology students were recruited from a university on the east 
coast of the United States, and business students were recruited from a university in 
southeastern France.  Students at both schools—in all 3 areas of functional expertise —
were enrolled in a course that involved a semester-long cross-national project; so, all 
students (consenting and non-consenting) had to complete the project, but only data from 
consenting students was used in analyses.  Participants were each randomly assigned to a 
functional expertise group within their class, and these groups were subsequently 
randomly assigned to global teams.  Each team consisted of 3 sub-teams, 1 from each 
area of functional expertise.  Sub-team size ranged from 2 to 4, and team size ranged 
from 8 to 9.  The sample was comprised of 226 participants organized into 27 teams.   
A Priori Power Analyses 
Due to the small overall sample size, a priori power analyses were conducted to 
determine alpha needed to detect a small, medium, and large effect size.  Cohen’s f2 
effect size for a multiple regression was used as the basis for said analyses: 
 
In this formula, R2 equals the squared multiple regression coefficient.  Cohen’s f2 was 
chosen as the measure of effect size to use for this study because it is appropriate when 
carrying out multiple regressions. 
Sample Size   
Table 4 illustrates the results of the a priori sample size power analyses.  Sample 
size, N, was computed as a function of: number of predictors; power level (1-β), which 




(f2).  At an alpha level of .05, the minimum sample sizes needed to detect an effect were 
as follows: 395 participants to detect a small (d=.20 or f2=.02) effect; 55 participants to 
detect a medium (d=.50 or f2=.15) effect; and 25 participants to detect a large (d=.80 or 
f2=.35) effect.  However, at an alpha of .10, the minimum sample sizes needed to detect 
an effect were as follows: 311 participants to detect a small effect; 43 participants to 
detect a medium effect; and 20 participants to detect a large effect.  According to a recent 
meta-analysis on faultline research, effect sizes for studies in this area tend to be 
relatively small.  For instance, the correlations between 6 different individual difference 
variables and team performance ranged from -.03 to -.07, and data from 39 independent 
studies suggested the correlation between demographic faultline strength and team 
performance to be -.14 (Thatcher & Patel, 2011).  These coefficients are small based on 
Cohen’s (1988) standards, which identify .10 as a small and .30 as a medium correlation 
coefficient.  Thus, this suggests the possibility that, due to the current study’s low sample 
size and the expectation of small effects in the variables of interest, failing to detect true 
relationships is more likely than mistakenly accepting false relationships.  
Sensitivity 
Further a priori power analyses were performed to gauge sensitivity, or to 
determine—for each planned analysis—what effect size may potentially be detected 
given a certain power level, alpha level, and sample size.  Specifically, effect size (f2) was 
computed as a function of: number of predictors; sample size (N); power level (1-β), 
which was consistently set at .80; and significance level (α).  For the current study, when 
alpha is set at .05, the minimum observed effect size would need to be f2=.31 in order to 




analysis.  But, when alpha is set at .10, the effect size needed to achieve statistical 
significance be f2=.24.  Table 5 displays the full set of sensitivities across all included 
analyses.  With this, alpha has been set at .10, due to the current study’s small sample 
size.  In the current study, the tradeoff between observing a false positive (Type I error) 
and the overall expected error rate (summation of the probability of Type I or Type II 
errors) is more reasonably balanced when utilizing the more liberal alpha level of .10 







Team-Level Sample Size Necessary to Reliably Detect an Effect Given a Theoretical Effect Size and Critical Alpha Level 
 





1a, 3a, 5a Faultline Strength Early Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity 
 
395 55 25 311 43 20 
1b, 3b, 5b Faultline Strength Early Subgroup Coordination 
Reciprocity 
 
395 55 25 311 43 20 
1a, 3c, 5a Faultline Strength Later Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity 
 
395 55 25 311 43 20 
1b, 3d, 5b Faultline Strength Later Subgroup Coordination 
Reciprocity 
 
395 55 25 311 43 20 
5 Faultline Strength Team Performance 
 
395 55 25 311 43 20 
4a, 5a Early Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity 
 
Team Performance 395 55 25 311 43 20 
4b, 5b Early Subgroup 
Coordination Reciprocity 
 
Team Performance 395 55 25 311 43 20 
4a, 5a Later Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity 
 
Team Performance 395 55 25 311 43 20 








Table 4 continued 
 









2a, 3a, 6a Faultline Strength Early Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity 
 
395 55 25 311 43 20 
2b, 3b, 6b Faultline Strength Early Subgroup Coordination 
Reciprocity 
 
395 55 25 311 43 20 
2a, 3c, 6a Faultline Strength Later Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity 
 
395 55 25 311 43 20 
2b, 3d, 6b Faultline Strength Later Subgroup Coordination 
Reciprocity 
 
395 55 25 311 43 20 
6 Faultline Strength Team Performance 
 
395 55 25 311 43 20 
4a, 6a Early Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity 
 
Team Performance 395 55 25 311 43 20 
4b, 6b Early Subgroup 
Coordination Reciprocity 
 
Team Performance 395 55 25 311 43 20 
4a, 6a Later Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity 
 
Team Performance 395 55 25 311 43 20 
4b, 6b Later Subgroup 
Coordination Reciprocity 
 
Team Performance 395 55 25 311 43 20 
Note. Power = .80.  Cohen’s (1988) conventions for effect size were used during power analyses: small effect, d=.20 (f2=.02); medium 








Observed Effect Size Needed to Achieve Significance Given Sample Size and Critical Alpha Level (N=27) 
 





1a, 3a, 5a Faultline Strength Early Subgroup Trust Reciprocity .31 .24 
1b, 3b, 5b Faultline Strength Early Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity .31 .24 
1a, 3c, 5a Faultline Strength Later Subgroup Trust Reciprocity .31 .24 
1b, 3d, 5b Faultline Strength Later Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity .31 .24 
5 Faultline Strength Team Performance .31 .24 
4a, 5a Early Subgroup Trust Reciprocity Team Performance .31 .24 
4b, 5b Early Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity Team Performance .31 .24 
4a, 5a Later Subgroup Trust Reciprocity Team Performance .31 .24 








2a, 3a, 6a Faultline Strength Early Subgroup Trust Reciprocity .31 .24 
2b, 3b, 6b Faultline Strength Early Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity .31 .24 
2a, 3c, 6a Faultline Strength Later Subgroup Trust Reciprocity .31 .24 
2b, 3d, 6b Faultline Strength Later Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity .31 .24 
6 Faultline Strength Team Performance .31 .24 
4a, 6a Early Subgroup Trust Reciprocity Team Performance .31 .24 
4b, 6b Early Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity Team Performance .31 .24 
4a, 6a Later Subgroup Trust Reciprocity Team Performance .31 .24 
4b, 6b Later Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity Team Performance .31 .24 






Students were presented with a challenge: collaborate in cross-functional, 
multinational teams for 8 weeks in order to produce an innovative pro-environment 
smartphone application.  Teams were tasked with the overarching goal of creating a 
smartphone application, with the general purpose of the application being to solve an 
environmental problem.  At the functional sub-team level, ecology students’ goal was to 
identify and comprehensively review an important, contemporary ecological problem.  
Psychology students’ goal was to identify behavioral and attitude change strategies in 
order to realize actual change.  Business students’ goal was to synthesize the ecological 
and psychological information provided them, and to create a marketable, potentially 
profitable application. 
During Phase I, students worked within their functional expertise areas, honing 
their specific expertise.  Ecology and psychology students worked on identifying 
important an environmental problem and the dysfunctional human behaviors supporting 
this problem, respectively, during Phase I of the project.  Meanwhile, the business teams 
researched smartphone application adoption.  During Phase II, the 3 areas of functional 
expertise produced a single deliverable.  The ecology teams researched databases to be 
included in the application, and the psychology teams specified what attitudes, behaviors, 
and cognitions the app needed to target.  The business teams incorporated the other 2 
teams’ work into the first draft of the app proposal.  Phase III involved each team 
receiving feedback and submitting as revised proposal.  In order to successfully complete 
Phases II and III, students needed to engage in global team collaboration, synthesizing 




communication methods such as: WebEx software (Cisco Systems, Inc., 2011), email, 
telephone, instant messaging, and social media websites.  Table 6 outlines the timeline of 








Detailed Outline of Measurement Phases 
 




0 1/23/12 to 1/25/12 n/a n/a 1/23/12 to 1/25/12 0 days Individual Difference 
Variables: Gender, Age, 
Narcissism, Psychological 
Collectivism 






2 2/27/12 3/2/12 3/9/12 3/7/12 to 3/8/12 11 days Sociometric Items:  Trust, 
Communication 
 
3 3/9/12 3/30/12 4/20/12 4/18/12 to 4/20/12 42 days Sociometric Items:  Trust, 
Communication 
Note. Measurement dates varied depending on what class participants belonged to.   






The following survey-based measures were administered to all participants. 
Attribute Variables 
“What is your gender?” assessed gender.  Response options were “Male,” 
“Female,” and “Other.” “What is your age?” assessed age, and response options ranging 
from 15 to 100 were provided. Ames, Rose, and Anderson’s (2006) forced-choice scale 
was used to assess narcissism.  An example item is: “I really like to be the center of 
attention” versus “It makes me unconformable to be the center of attention.”  Less 
narcissistic responses were given a score of “1” and more narcissistic responses were 
given a score of “2.”  Psychological collectivism was assessed using Jackson, Colquitt, 
Wesson, and Zapata-Phelan’s (2006) 15-item measure.  An example item is “I preferred 
to work in those groups rather than working alone.”  
Faultline scores were calculated based on the procedure set forth by Thatcher, 
Jehn, and Zanutto (2003); Table 2 illustrates the different steps taken to calculate faultline 
strength in the form of a series of equations.  Gender, age, and area of functional 
expertise (applied ecology, social science, or strategic management) were used to 
calculate social faultline scores, and narcissism, psychological collectivism, and area of 
functional expertise (applied ecology, social science, or strategic management) were used 
to calculate informational faultlines scores.  Functional expertise was used to calculated 
both social and information faultlines because it can be conceptualized as both a social 
and informational characteristic of the group members.   
Specifically, in order to calculate faultline scores, raw data was entered into an 




Next, the data was rescaled; dividing each datum by the square root of 2 rescaled 
categorical variables, and dividing each datum by the overall variable’s standard 
deviation rescaled continuous variables.  Then, averages were computed for each rescaled 
variable, and difference scores—each individual rescaled score minus the average for the 
rescaled variable—and sums of squares were calculated for each rescaled variable.  To 
calculate the total sums of square, the sums of squares across all variables were added up.  
Next, all possible combinations of subgroups were listed, not accounting for single-
member subgroups. Average subgroup characteristics are calculated by averaging the 
rescaled scores for each variable for each subgroup.  Then, grand mean of the rescaled 
data for each variable was subtracted from each average subgroup characteristic.  This 
value was squared, and multiplied by the number of people in the subgroup, to control for 
group size.  The between sums of squares was tabulated, and then added together for the 
total between sums of squares.  Finally, the total between sums of squares for each 
combination of individuals was divided by the overall total sums of squares.  This 
produced a faultline score for each combination, and the largest score is the overall 
faultline score for the group (Thatcher, Jehn, & Zanutto, 2003).  This particular 
combination of individuals represents the situation in which the social/informational 
differences between individuals maximize the rift between subgroups in terms of 
trust/coordination.  Faultline scores, similar to correlation coefficients, range from 0 to 1; 
however, faultline scores are always positive.  A high faultline score indicates a clear rift 
between subgroups, while a low faultline score indicates the absence of a clear rift 






A sociometric prompt, where each participant described every other member of 
the team, was used to gauge trust.  “I have a trusting relationship with this person” was 
the statement used to assess trust.  Participants could either indicate the veracity of the 
statement by checking a box, or could leave the box unchecked; these responses were 
coded as “1” and “0,” respectively.  
Coordination 
Sociometric prompts were also used to assess coordination.  Coordination, in the 
form of communication, was measured by asking, “While you and your team were 
working to complete Goal #, who did you communicate with frequently?”  Responses for 
this item were made in the form of participants ticking a box to indicate that they had 
communicated with an individual.   
Team Performance 
Subject matter experts were used to assess the quality of the final deliverables for 
all three functional expertise areas; specifically, the raters judged how impactful the 
students’ projects were, based on criteria specific to the students’ areas of expertise.  
Ecology teams’ performance was rated on a 1 to 5 scale in terms of the environmental 
utility of the proposals.  Psychology teams’ performance was rated on a 1 to 4 scale in 
terms of the expected magnitude of behavior change.  Business teams’ performance was 
similarly rated on a 1 to 4 scale in terms of the novelty of the proposal, with more novel 
proposal being of higher value.  The final team system performance score was a 
multiplicative term of the three component functional expertise area performance scores.  




ecology ranged from .67 to 3.91.  Possible functional scores for psychology ranged from 
1 to 4; observed functional scores for psychology ranged from 2.25 to 4.00.  Possible 
functional scores for business ranged from 1 to 4; observed functional scores for business 
ranged from 1.54 to 3.17. Multiplicative team performance scores could range from 1 to 
80; observed scores in the current sample of teams ranged from 4.70 to 46.95. 
Dyadic Processes  
There are a variety of ways to gauge emergent states using network methodology.  
At the dyadic network level—or at the level of analysis involving pairs of individuals—
one common index is reciprocity, which reflects the “prevalence of reciprocity in [the] 
network” (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005), or the frequency of symmetric relations.  
Theoretically, reciprocity indicates the level of stability of the overall network; “the 
degree of "reciprocity"…in relations can be regarded as important indicators of the 
stability and institutionalization (that is, the extent to which relations are taken for 
granted and are norm governed) of actor's positions in social networks” (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005).  As illustrated in Figure 2, groups that have low levels of reciprocity have 
a high number of asymmetric relations, whereas groups that have high levels of 
reciprocity have a high number of symmetrical relations, regardless of the overall 
network density.  In other words, reciprocity is “[t]he degree to which a relation is 
commonly perceived and agreed upon by all parties to the relation [i.e., the degree of 
symmetry]” (Tichy, Tushman, & Fombrun, 1979, p. 508); it is a situation with directed 
data where ties are symmetrical, or if A indicates a tie with B then B also indicates a tie 




arc method.  The dyad method involved calculating the proportion of dyads, or pairs of 
individuals, that have a reciprocated tie between them.  The equation is as follows: 
 
Alternatively, the arc method looks at the number of ties involved in reciprocal relations 
relative to the total number of ties, or less commonly, relative to the total number of 
possible ties (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  The current study used the dyad method for 
calculating reciprocity in UCINET (Network>Cohesion>Reciprocity; Borgatti, Everett, 
& Freeman, 2002).  Sociograms are also commonly used to assess reciprocity (Scott, 
















Figure 2.  Visual depiction of high and low reciprocity teams exhibiting a small, 






Even in directed network ties tend towards reciprocity (Hoff, Raftery, & 
Handcock, 2002), and the case of human social networks is no exception; human 
networks tend to display high reciprocity, a unique exception being the Twitter social 
network, in which 77.9% of individuals are connected to one another via a unidirectional 
tie (i.e., individuals tend to “follow” people such as celebrities or public figures that do 
not “follow back”; Kwak, Lee, Park, & Moon, 2010).  However, it should be noted that 
although this lack of reciprocity on Twitter is true for the phenomenon of following, 
reciprocated communications (i.e., tweets) are 2 to 3 times more prevalent than 
unreciprocated communications (Cheng, Romero, Meeder, & Kleinberg, 2011).  
Reciprocal ties between individuals can have positive connotations, such as reciprocal 
trust (Nguyen, Lim, Tan, Jiang, & Sun, 2010) and reciprocal coordination ties (Provan & 
Sebastian, 1998), and also, negative connotations, such as reciprocal dislike.  Moreover, 
there are implications for unidirectional ties for a multitude of variables, such as trust 











Hypothesis Model/Equation Coefficient 
Relevant to 
Hypothesis 
1a Social faultline strength (β1) will 
positively predict subgroup trust 







1b Social faultline strength (β1) will 
positively predict subgroup 
coordination reciprocity among 







2a Informational faultline strength 
(β1) will positively predict 
subgroup trust reciprocity among 




2b Informational faultline strength 
(β1) will positively predict 
subgroup coordination reciprocity 






3a Social faultline strength will 
positively predict early subgroup 
trust reciprocity more strongly 
than will informational faultline 
strength. 
Refer to coefficients from 1a and 2a. 
3b Social faultline strength will 
positively predict early subgroup 
coordination reciprocity more 
strongly than will informational 
faultline strength. 
Refer to coefficients from 1b and 2b. 
3c Informational faultline strength 
will positively predict later 
subgroup trust reciprocity more 
strongly than will social faultline 
strength. 
Refer to coefficients from 1a and 2a. 
3d Informational faultline strength 
will positively predict later 
subgroup coordination reciprocity 
more strongly than will social 
faultline strength. 





Table 7 continued 
 




Hypothesis Model/Equation Coefficient 
Relevant to 
Hypothesis 
4a Subgroup trust reciprocity (β1) will 





4b Subgroup coordination reciprocity 





5a Subgroup trust reciprocity (β2) will 
mediate the relation between social 
faultline (β1) strength and team 
performance. 
1. Team Performance 
=β0+β1Xi+εi 
2. Trust Reciprocity 
=β0+β1Xi+εi 
3. Team Performance 
=β0+β1Xi+β2Xi+εi 









5b Subgroup coordination reciprocity 
(β2) will mediate the relation 
between social faultline strength 
(β1) and team performance. 
1. Team Performance 
=β0+β1Xi+εi 
2. Trust Reciprocity 
=β0+β1Xi+εi 
3. Team Performance 
=β0+β1Xi+β2Xi+εi 









6a Subgroup trust reciprocity (β2) will 
mediate the relation between 
informational faultline strength (β1) 
and team performance. 
1. Team Performance 
=β0+β1Xi+εi 
2. Trust Reciprocity 
=β0+β1Xi+εi 
3. Team Performance 
=β0+β1Xi+β2Xi+εi 









6b Subgroup coordination reciprocity 
(β2) will mediate the relation 
between informational faultline 
strength (β1) and team performance. 
1. Team Performance 
=β0+β1Xi+εi 
2. Trust Reciprocity 
=β0+β1Xi+εi 
3. Team Performance 
=β0+β1Xi+β2Xi+εi 















Before beginning hypothesis testing, I endeavored to test the assumptions of 
regression analysis, starting with that of the normal distribution.   
Distributional Normality 
First, all variables were checked to ensure that the observed distributions are 
reasonably normal.  A visual analysis of a histogram—or frequency distribution—was 
carried out for each variable, the results of which can be seen in Figures 1 through 13. 
Next, a visual analysis of the Q-Q plot for each variable was performed.  Q-Q-plots 
graphically depict whether 2 datasets share a common distribution by comparing 
quantiles of an observed distribution with quantiles of a standardized theoretical 
distribution (e.g., Kratz & Resnick, 1996).  In this case, they depict the relation between 
the observed data and the expected normal distribution.  These plots can be found in 
Figures 14 through 24.  Based on a visual examination of the histograms and Q-Q plots, 
all the variables appeared to be relatively normally distributed, with the exception of: 1) 
informational faultline strength; 2) average weighted early subgroup trust reciprocity for 
networks partitioned based on social faultline strength; 3) average weighted early 
subgroup coordination reciprocity for networks partitioned based on social faultline 
strength; 4) average weighted later subgroup trust reciprocity for networks partitioned 
based on social faultline strength; 5) average weighted later subgroup trust reciprocity for 















Figure 4.  Frequency distributions of informational faultline strength scores.  The top 
histogram represents the untransformed variable, and the bottom histogram represents the 








Figure 5.  Frequency distributions of weighted average early subgroup trust reciprocity 
scores for networks dichotomized based on social faultline strength.  The top histogram 
represents the untransformed variable, and the bottom histogram represents the 






Figure 6.  Frequency distribution of weighted average early subgroup trust reciprocity 








Figure 7.  Frequency distributions of weighted average early subgroup coordination 
reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on social faultline strength.  The top 
histogram represents the untransformed variable, and the bottom histogram represents the 






Figure 8.  Frequency distribution of weighted average early subgroup coordination 









Figure 9.  Frequency distributions of weighted average later subgroup trust reciprocity 
scores for networks dichotomized based on social faultline strength.  The top histogram 
represents the untransformed variable, and the bottom histogram represents the 







Figure 10.  Frequency distributions of weighted average later subgroup trust reciprocity 
scores for networks dichotomized based on informational faultline strength.  The top 
histogram represents the untransformed variable, and the bottom histogram represents the 






Figure 11.  Frequency distribution of weighted average later subgroup coordination 







Figure 12.  Frequency distribution of weighted average later subgroup coordination 










Figure 13.  Frequency distributions of team performance scores.  The top histogram 
represents the untransformed variable, and the bottom histogram represents the 















Figure 15.  Q-Q plots of informational faultline strength scores.  The top Q-Q plot 
represents the untransformed variable, and the bottom Q-Q plot represents the 







Figure 16.  Q-Q plots of weighted average early subgroup trust reciprocity scores for 
networks dichotomized based on social faultline strength.  The top Q-Q plot represents 







Figure 17.  Q-Q plot of weighted average early subgroup trust reciprocity scores for 








Figure 18.  Q-Q plots of weighted average early subgroup coordination reciprocity scores 
for networks dichotomized based on social faultline strength.  The top Q-Q plot 
represents the untransformed variable, and the bottom Q-Q plot represents the 






Figure 19.  Q-Q plot of weighted average early subgroup coordination reciprocity scores 








Figure 20.  Q-Q plots of weighted average later subgroup trust reciprocity scores for 
networks dichotomized based on social faultline strength.  The top Q-Q plot represents 









Figure 21.  Q-Q plots of weighted average later subgroup trust reciprocity scores for 
networks dichotomized based on informational faultline strength.  The top Q-Q plot 
represents the untransformed variable, and the bottom Q-Q plot represents the 






Figure 22.  Q-Q plot of weighted average later subgroup coordination reciprocity scores 







Figure 23.  Q-Q plot of weighted average later subgroup coordination reciprocity scores 









Figure 24.  Q-Q plots of team performance scores.  The top Q-Q plot represents the 





Due to the aforementioned observed departure from normality, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests were performed to verify each distribution’s normality 
(or lack thereof).  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test can be used as a goodness of fit test 
(e.g., Massey, 1951; Lilliefors, 1967).  In the case of testing for normality, samples are 
standardized and compared with a standard normal distribution.  The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test is more general but less powerful than the Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro & 
Wilk, 1965; Shapiro & Francia, 1972).  In both cases, a statistic that is not statistically 
significant indicates that the distribution for that variable is relatively normal, whereas a 
statistic that is statistically significant indicates that the distribution for that variable is not 
normal.  The resulting statistics, which can be found in Tables 8 through 10, provided 
confirmatory evidence for the non-normality of the same variables that were identified as 







Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk Tests of Normality for Social Faultline 
Strength and Other Related Variables (N=27) 
 
Variable Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk Statistic df p value Statistic df p value 
Social Faultline Strength 
 
.10 27 .20 .96 27 .29 




.14 27 .16 .91 27 .03 




.13 27 .20 .98 27 .74 




.17 27 .06 .91 27 .02 




.10 27 .20 .95 27 .20 




.20 27 .01 .92 27 .04 




.15 27 .11 .95 27 .25 
Average Weighted Later 
Subgroup Coordination 
Reciprocity 
.17 27 .06 .94 27 .11 
Note.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by 








Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk Tests of Normality for Informational 
Faultline Strength and Other Related Variables (N=27) 
 








.12 27 .20 .96 27 .32 
Average Weighted Early 
Subgroup Trust  
Reciprocity 
 
.11 27 .20 .97 27 .60 




.16 27 .10 .94 27 .15 
Average Weighted Later 
Subgroup Trust Reciprocity 
 
.25 27 .00 .89 27 .01 
Average Weighted Later 
Subgroup Trust Reciprocity† 
 
.16 27 .07 .93 27 .07 
Average Weighted Later 
Subgroup Coordination 
Reciprocity 
.13 27 .20 .94 27 .15 
Note.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by 









Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk Tests of Normality for Team Performance 
(N=27) 
 
Variable Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk Statistic df p value Statistic df p value 
Team Performance 
 
.23 27 .00 .80 27 .00 
Team Performance† .10 27 .20 .96 27 .46 







Finally, the skewness and kurtosis of each distribution were assessed.  Skewness 
is a measure of the extent to which a distribution is symmetrical or asymmetrical, and 
kurtosis is a measure of how peaked or flat a distribution is.  For both skewness and 
kurtosis, values ranging from about -2 to 2 are acceptable in terms of normality (Muthén 
& Kaplan, 1985), with 0 indicating a totally normal distribution.  The skewness and 
kurtosis statistics for the current dataset can be found in Tables 11 through 13.  All values 








Skewness and Kurtosis Statistics for Social Faultline Strength and Other Related Variables 
(N=27) 
 
Variable Skewness Kurtosis Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Social Faultline Strength 
 
.19 .45 -.94 .87 
Average Weighted Early Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity 
 
1.06 .45 .75 .87 
Average Weighted Early Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity† 
 
-.25 .45 .08 .87 
Average Weighted Early Subgroup 
Coordination Reciprocity 
 
.73 .45 -.47 .87 
Average Weighted Early Subgroup 
Coordination Reciprocity† 
 
.05 .45 -1.18 .87 
Average Weighted Later Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity 
 
.81 .45 .22 .87 
Average Weighted Later Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity† 
 
.23 .45 -.28 .87 
Average Weighted Later Subgroup 
Coordination Reciprocity 
.49 .45 2.06 .87 
Note.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by subgroup 







Skewness and Kurtosis Statistics for Informational Faultline Strength and Other 
Related Variables (N=27) 
 
Variable Skewness Kurtosis Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Informational Faultline Strength 
 
1.02 .45 .05 .87 
Informational Faultline Strength† 
 
.04 .45 -.99 .87 
Average Weighted Early Subgroup 
Trust Reciprocity 
 
.56 .45 -.07 .87 
Average Weighted Early Subgroup 
Coordination Reciprocity 
 
.50 .45 .77 .87 
Average Weighted Later Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity 
 
.86 .45 -.11 .87 
Average Weighted Later Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity† 
 
.51 .45 1.34 .87 
Average Weighted Later Subgroup 
Coordination Reciprocity 
.33 .45 -.94 .87 
Note.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by 


















Skewness and Kurtosis Statistics for Informational Faultline Strength and Other 
Related Variables (N=27) 
 
Variable Skewness Kurtosis Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Team Performance 
 
1.70 .45 2.37 .87 
Team Performance† .49 .45 -.17 .87 










Based on analyzing the histograms and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-
Wilk statistics, 6 variables were identified as being non-normally distributed: 1) 
informational faultline strength; 2) average weighted early subgroup trust reciprocity for 
networks partitioned based on social faultline strength; 3) average weighted early 
subgroup coordination reciprocity for networks partitioned based on social faultline 
strength; 4) average weighted later subgroup trust reciprocity for networks partitioned 
based on social faultline strength; 5) average weighted later subgroup trust reciprocity for 
networks partitioned based on informational faultline strength; and 6) team performance.  
These variables were transformed in order to normalize their distributions; these 
transformations are outlined in Table 14.  Histograms and Q-Q plots for transformed 
variables are also displayed in Figures 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, and 24, and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test statistics for transformed variables are 
included in Tables 8 through 13.  Transformed versions of these variables were included 








Outline of Transformations Carried Out on Non-Normal Variables 
 
Variable Transformation 
Informational Faultline Strength 
 (variable)
-4 
Average Weighted Early Subgroup Trust Reciprocity  
Network Partitioned Based on Social Faultline Strength 
 
log10(variable) 
Average Weighted Early Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity 
Network Partitioned Based on Social Faultline Strength 
 
log10(variable) 
Average Weighted Later Subgroup Trust Reciprocity 
Network Partitioned Based on Social Faultline Strength 
 
 
Average Weighted Later Subgroup Trust Reciprocity 
Network Partitioned Based on Informational Faultline Strength 
 
(variable)-4 










The next diagnostic test that was performed was an outlier analysis.  Outliers are 
observations where the dependent variable value is conditionally unusual given the value 
of the independent variable (Fox, 1997).  This regression-based definition of outliers was 
incorporated into the analyses by looking at scatterplot matrices for each predicted 
relation, as seen in Figures 25 through 42.  Using the transformed variables, none of the 








Figure 25.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between social faultline strength and 













Figure 26.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between transformed informational 













Figure 27.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between social faultline strength and 
transformed weighted average early subgroup trust reciprocity scores for networks 












Figure 28.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between transformed weighted average 
early subgroup trust reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on social 












Figure 29.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between social faultline strength and 
transformed weighted average early subgroup coordination reciprocity scores for 












Figure 30.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between transformed weighted average 
early subgroup coordination reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on social 












Figure 31.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between transformed informational 
faultline strength and weighted average early subgroup trust reciprocity scores for 












Figure 32.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between weighted average early 
subgroup trust reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on informational 






Figure 33.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between transformed informational 
faultline strength and weighted average early subgroup coordination reciprocity scores 












Figure 34.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between weighted average early 
subgroup coordination reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on 












Figure 35.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between social faultline strength and 
transformed weighted average later subgroup trust reciprocity scores for networks 








Figure 36.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between transformed weighted average 
later subgroup trust reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on social 








Figure 37.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between social faultline strength and 
weighted average later subgroup coordination reciprocity scores for networks 








Figure 38.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between weighted average later 
subgroup coordination reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on social 








Figure 39.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between transformed informational 
faultline strength and transformed weighted average later subgroup trust reciprocity 












Figure 40.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between transformed weighted average 
later subgroup trust reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on informational 









Figure 41.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between transformed informational 
faultline strength and weighted average later subgroup coordination reciprocity scores for 








Figure 42.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between weighted average later 
subgroup coordination reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on 








Scatterplots of residuals are commonly used to assess heteroscedasticity of data 
via the “eyeballing” method—doing a visual search for areas where residual values are 
clumped together.  Optimally, all of the points in these scatterplots should be randomly 
scattered, indicating that the data’s error is not systematic.  Scatterplot matrices of 
residuals for the current study’s regression analyses, as seen in Figures 43 through 60, 







Figure 43.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing transformed team performance on 








Figure 44.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing transformed team performance on 








Figure 45.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing transformed weighted average early 
subgroup trust reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on social faultline 









Figure 46.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing transformed team performance on 
transformed weighted average early subgroup trust reciprocity scores for networks 








Figure 47.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing transformed weighted average early 
subgroup coordination reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on social 








Figure 48.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing transformed team performance on 
transformed weighted average early subgroup coordination reciprocity scores for 









Figure 49.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing weighted average early subgroup trust 
reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on informational faultline strength on 









Figure 50.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing transformed team performance on 
weighted average early subgroup trust reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized 










Figure 51.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing weighted average early subgroup 
coordination reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on informational 









Figure 52.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing transformed team performance on 
weighted average early subgroup coordination reciprocity scores for networks 
dichotomized based on informational faultline strength and transformed informational 











Figure 53.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing transformed weighted average later 
subgroup trust reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on social faultline 










Figure 54.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing transformed team performance on 
transformed weighted average later subgroup trust reciprocity scores for networks 









Figure 55.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing weighted average later subgroup 
coordination reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on social faultline 










Figure 56.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing transformed team performance on 
weighted average later subgroup coordination reciprocity scores for networks 









Figure 57.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing transformed weighted average later 
subgroup trust reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on informational 









Figure 58.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing transformed team performance on 
transformed weighted average later subgroup trust reciprocity scores for networks 
dichotomized based on informational faultline strength and transformed informational 









Figure 59.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing weighted average later subgroup 
coordination reciprocity scores for networks dichotomized based on informational 









Figure 60.  Scatterplot matrix plotting the relation between predicted and observed 
regression standardized residuals when regressing transformed team performance on 
weighted average later subgroup coordination reciprocity scores for networks 
dichotomized based on informational faultline strength and transformed informational 






In addition, the Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch & Pagan, 1979; Waldman, 1983)—
which is used to evaluate heteroscedasticity in linear regression models—was carried out.  
Specifically, this test regresses squared residuals onto independent variables to test 
whether the estimated variance of errors from a regression are dependent on the 
independent variables’ values.  However, the Breusch-Pagan test is sensitive to the 
normality of the residual distribution.  Thus, the Koenker (1981) test, which is still valid 
even if errors are non-normal and is more powerful than the Breusch-Pagan (Lyon & 
Tsai, 1996), was used as a supplement.  Rejecting the null hypothesis, for both tests, is an 
indication of heteroscedasticity; therefore, as seen in Tables 15 through 17, the error 









Breusch-Pagan and Koenker Tests for Heteroscedasticity Statistics for Regressions Using 
Networks Partitioned Based on Social Faultline Strength (N=27) 
 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable df 
Breusch-Pagan Koenker 




























Early Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity† 
Team 







































































Note.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by subgroup 







Breusch-Pagan and Koenker Tests for Heteroscedasticity Statistics for Regressions 







































































































1 .96 .33 1.10 .29 
Note.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by 










Breusch-Pagan and Koenker Tests for Heteroscedasticity Statistics for Regressions Using 


















































































Performance† 1 2.47 .29 2.94 .23 
Note.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by subgroup 




Bivariate Correlations Among Focal Variables 
Next, covariance and—when applicable—multicollinearity were assessed by 
evaluating intercorrelations of all variables, as displayed in Tables 18 and 19.  
Transformed variables were used in place of variables whose distributions were 
previously found to be non-normal.  In general, the use of transformed variables in place 
of non-normal variables should be assumed from this point forward.  Additionally, all 
variables included in these 2 tables, save for faultline strength and performance variables, 
were weighted by subgroup size, and from this point on that will also be assumed rather 
than continually restated.  These analyses revealed several significant correlations of 
interest.   
First, Table 18 displays the intercorrelations between key reciprocity indices for 
networks dichotomized based on social faultline strength.  Essentially, these correlations 
in this table indicate the degree to which social faultline strength and performance are 
related to subgroup reciprocity, and the degree to which social faultline strength-based 
reciprocity scores are related to one another.  Of the 3 statistically significant correlations 
presented in Table 18, 2 were between the same construct measured different time 
points—early and later subgroup trust (r=.57, p<.01) and coordination (r=.45, p<.05) 
reciprocity.  Significant correlations between these variables are to be expected, and 
provide evidence of convergent validity for trust and coordination, respectively.  In 
addition, later subgroup trust reciprocity and later subgroup coordination reciprocity were 
related (r=.45, p<.05), which is acceptable because these predictors are not included 







Descriptives and Intercorrelations between Reciprocity Indices based on Social Faultline Strength (N=27) 
 
Variable M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.  
1. Social Faultline 
Strength 
 
.59 .10 1.00      
2. Average Weighted 
Early Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity† 
 
.15 .24 .20 1.00     




.21 .23 .29 .00 1.00    
4. Average Weighted 
Later Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity† 
 
1.28 .33 .18 .57** .15 1.00   




1.92 .70 -.03 -.06 .45* .45* 1.00  
6. Team Performance† 1.10 .26 .30 .19 .28 .16 .26 1.00 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by subgroup size.  Sample 










Descriptives and Intercorrelations between Reciprocity Indices based on Informational Faultline Strength (N=27) 
 
Variable M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.  
1. Informational Faultline 
Strength† 
 
24.09 11.95 1.00      
2. Average Weighted 
Early Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity 
 
1.79 .87 .02 1.00     




1.68 .71 .02 .09 1.00    
4. Average Weighted 
Later Subgroup Trust 
Reciprocity† 
 
.84 .13 -.22 -.49** -.25 1.00   




1.84 1.03 -.14 .22 .37+ -.69*** 1.00  
6. Team Performance† 1.10 .26 -.34+ -.02 -.02 .16 -.07 1.00 
Note. +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by 







Table 19 displays the intercorrelations between key reciprocity indices for 
networks dichotomized based on informational faultline strength.  Essentially, these 
correlations in this table indicate the degree to which informational faultline strength and 
performance are related to subgroup reciprocity, and the degree to which informational 
faultline strength-based reciprocity scores are related to one another.  Two instances of 
significant correlations between the same variable at different time points—correlations 
which, again, indicate convergent validity for said constructs—were observed, between 
early and later subgroup trust (r=-.49, p<.01) and coordination (r=.37, p<.10) reciprocity.  
In addition, later subgroup trust reciprocity and later subgroup coordination reciprocity 
were related (r=-.69, p<.001), which is acceptable because these predictors are not 
included together in any of the same regression models.  Furthermore, informational 
faultline strength was negatively related to team performance (r=-.34, p<.10), but is 
theoretically meaningful and not indicative of multicollinearity because team 






Faultline Strength Predicting Subgroup Reciprocity  
Hypotheses 1 through 3 were tested first by weighting each subgroup’s 
reciprocity score by subgroup size.  Next, in order to bring these subgroup-level scores to 
the team level, to parallel the team-level predictor—faultline strength—the weighted 
subgroup reciprocity scores were averaged together: 
 
The two subgroups’ reciprocity scores were combined in this way so that all of the 
variables in the regression model would be at the same level of analysis as faultline 
strength, at the team level.  This average weighted reciprocity score was regressed onto 
social/informational faultline strength.  Thus, following regression model was used to test 
Hypotheses 1 through 3: 
 
In this model,  represents the impact of social/informational faultline strength on 
average weighted reciprocity.  In addition, trust and coordination networks for each team 
were partitioned into subgroups (in order to calculate subgroup-level reciprocity, and 
carry out further analyses) based on either the strongest social or the strongest 
informational faultline, depending on the predictor.  Due to this model being at the team 
level, the sample size for analyses was 27.   
Hypothesis 1—that social faultline strength would positively predict subgroup 
trust (1a) and coordination (1b) reciprocity among members of the same subgroup—was 
not supported by the data.  Hypothesis 2—that informational faultline strength would 




of the same subgroup—was also not supported by the data.  Detailed findings for these 
analyses can be found in Tables 20 through 27 (under mediation step 2, or mediation step 
a).  Hypotheses 3 could not properly be tested because the associated beta weights from 
testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not significant, and therefore not meaningful to 







Regression Analyses Testing the Average Weighted Early Subgroup Trust Reciprocity as a Mediator of the Relation between 
Social Faultline Strength and Team Performance (N=27) 
 
Mediation 
Step Predictor Control Dependent Variable R
2 F Predictor Control β t β t 
1 (c) Social Faultline 
Strength 
 
- Team Performance† .09 2.40 .30 1.55 - - 
2 (a) Social Faultline 
Strength 




.04 1.00 .20 1.00 - - 
3 (b) Average Weighted 





Team Performance† .11 1.42 .14 .70 .27 1.37 





Team Performance† .11 1.42 .27 1.37 .14 .70 
Note.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by subgroup size.  Sample size reflects the total 








Regression Analyses Testing the Average Weighted Early Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity as a Mediator of the Relation 
between Social Faultline Strength and Team Performance (N=27) 
 
Mediation 
Step Predictor Control Dependent Variable R
2 F Predictor Control β t β t 
1 (c) Social Faultline 
Strength 
 
- Team Performance† .09 2.40 .30 1.55 - - 
2 (a) Social Faultline 
Strength 





.09 2.36 .29 1.54 - - 







Team Performance† .13 1.75 .21 1.04 .24 1.18 






Team Performance† .13 1.75 .24 1.18 .21 1.04 
Note.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by subgroup size.  Sample size reflects the total 







Regression Analyses Testing the Average Weighted Early Subgroup Trust Reciprocity as a Mediator of the Relation between 
Informational Faultline Strength and Team Performance (N=27) 
 
Mediation 
Step Predictor Control Dependent Variable R
2 F Predictor Control β t β t 
1 (c) Informational Faultline 
Strength† 
 
- Team Performance† .12 3.36+ -.34+ -1.83 - - 
2 (a) Informational Faultline 
Strength† 
 
- Average Weighted 
Early Subgroup 
Trust Reciprocity  
 
.00 .01 .02 .11 - - 
3 (b) Average Weighted 





Team Performance† .12 1.62 -.02 -.08 -.34+ -1.79 





Team Performance† .12 1.62 -.34+ -1.79 -.02 -.08 
Note.  +p<.10.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by subgroup size.  Sample size reflects 










Regression Analyses Testing the Average Weighted Early Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity as a Mediator of the Relation 
between Informational Faultline Strength and Team Performance (N=27) 
 
Mediation 
Step Predictor Control Dependent Variable R
2 F Predictor Control β t β t 
1 (c) Informational Faultline 
Strength† 
 
- Team Performance† .12 3.36+ -.34+ -1.83 - - 
2 (a) Informational Faultline 
Strength† 
 





.00 .01 .02 .10 - - 







Team Performance† .12 1.62 -.02 -.09 -.34+ -1.80 






Team Performance† .12 1.62 -.34+ -1.80 -.02 -.09 
Note.  +p<.10.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by subgroup size.  Sample size reflects 










Regression Analyses Testing the Average Weighted Later Subgroup Trust Reciprocity as a Mediator of the Relation between 
Social Faultline Strength and Team Performance (N=27) 
 
Mediation 
Step Predictor Control Dependent Variable R
2 F Predictor Control β t β t 
1 (c) Social Faultline 
Strength 
 
- Team Performance† .09 2.40 .30 1.55 - - 
2 (a) Social Faultline 
Strength 




.03 .81 .18 .90 - - 






Team Performance† .10 1.34 .12 .58 .28 1.40 





Team Performance† .10 1.34 .28 1.40 .12 .58 
Note.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by subgroup size.  Sample size reflects the total 









Regression Analyses Testing the Average Weighted Later Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity as a Mediator of the Relation 
between Social Faultline Strength and Team Performance (N=27) 
 
Mediation 
Step Predictor Control Dependent Variable R
2 F Predictor Control β t β t 
1 (c) Social Faultline 
Strength 
 
- Team Performance† .09 2.40 .30 1.55 - - 
2 (a) Social Faultline 
Strength 





.00 .02 -.03 -.13 - - 






Team Performance† .16 2.28 .27 1.44 .30 1.62 






Team Performance† .16 2.28 .30 1.62 .27 1.44 
Note.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by subgroup size.  Sample size reflects the total 










Regression Analyses Testing the Average Weighted Later Subgroup Trust Reciprocity as a Mediator of the Relation between 
Informational Faultline Strength and Team Performance (N=27) 
 
Mediation 
Step Predictor Control Dependent Variable R
2 F Predictor Control β t β t 
1 (c) Informational Faultline 
Strength† 
 
- Team Performance† .12 3.36+ -.34+ -1.83 - - 
2 (a) Informational Faultline 
Strength† 
 




.05 1.21 -.22 -1.10 - - 






Team Performance† .13 1.73 .09 .46 -.33 -1.66 





Team Performance† .13 1.73 -.33 -1.66 .09 .46 
Note.  +p<.10.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by subgroup size.  Sample size reflects 










Regression Analyses Testing the Average Weighted Later Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity as a Mediator of the Relation 
between Informational Faultline Strength and Team Performance (N=27) 
 
Mediation 
Step Predictor Control Dependent Variable R
2 F Predictor Control β t β t 
1 (c) Informational Faultline 
Strength† 
 
- Team Performance† .12 3.36+ -.34+ -1.83 - - 
2 (a) Informational Faultline 
Strength† 
 





.02 .51 -.14 -.72 - - 






Team Performance† .13 1.83 -.12 -.62 -.36+ -1.88 






Team Performance† .13 1.83 -.36+ -1.88 -.12 -.62 
Note.  +p<.10.  †Transformed variable.  All subgroup reciprocity scores were weighted by subgroup size.  Sample size reflects 











Subgroup Reciprocity Predicting Team Performance 
The following regression equation was used to test Hypothesis 4: 
 
The coefficient  represents the impact of the average weighted subgroup reciprocity 
on team performance, the significance of which was used to determine whether the 
hypothesis should be accepted or rejected.  Variation in subgroup size was accounted for 
by weighting each subgroup reciprocity score by subgroup size.  The coefficient  
represents the impact of the control variable, faultline strength.  Hypothesis 4 was not 
supported by the data.  Tables 20 through 27 (under mediation step 3, or mediation step 
b) display the detailed results related to this hypothesis.  
Trust and Coordination as Mediators 
 Hypotheses 5 and 6 were tested using the Baron and Kenny (1986; Judd & 
Kenny, 1981) steps, a method that employs regression techniques to estimate paths in a 
mediational model.  In order to test multiple mediators in the same model the mediating 
variables must be conceptually distinct and not highly correlated (Kenny, 2012); 
therefore, early and late trust and coordination reciprocity were tested separately from 
one another rather than in the same model.  First, team performance was regressed onto 
social and informational faultline strength to establish that an effect that may be mediated 
exists.  Tables 20 through 27 (under mediation step 1, or mediation step c) display the 
results of this first step.  Informational faultline strength predicted performance at a 
statically significant level (β=-.34, p<.10), but the same did not hold true for social 
faultline strength.  Next, average weighted early and late trust and coordination 




establish a relation between these two parts of the mediational model; Tables 20 through 
27 (under mediation step 2, or mediation step a) display the results of this second step.  
Faultline strength did not significantly predict average weighted early and late trust and 
coordination reciprocity, for any of the mediational models.  Third, team performance 
was regressed onto average weighted early and late trust and coordination reciprocity 
scores while controlling for social and informational faultline strength.  Tables 20 
through 27 (under mediation step 3, or mediation step b) display the results of this third 
step.  Average weighted early and late trust and coordination reciprocity did not 
significantly predict team performance, for any of the mediational models.  Finally, 
Tables 20 through 27 (under mediation step 3, or mediation step c’) display the results of 
the fourth step of testing a mediational model, assessing whether a mediational relation is 
partial or full.   Team performance was regressed onto social and informational faultline 
strength while controlling for average weighted early and late trust and coordination 
reciprocity scores.  Because social and informational faultline strength scores have 
nonzero relations with team performance, even when controlling for average weighted 
early and late trust and coordination reciprocity, any observed mediational effects would 
be partial rather than full.  Figures 61 through 64 display all mediational models and 










Figure 61.  Models depicting subgroup trust reciprocity at 2 time points mediating the 
relation between social faultline strength and team performance, with associated beta 










Figure 62.  Models depicting subgroup coordination reciprocity at 2 time points 
mediating the relation between social faultline strength and team performance, with 










Figure 63.  Models depicting subgroup trust reciprocity at 2 time points mediating the 
relation between informational faultline strength and team performance, with associated 










Figure 64.  Models depicting subgroup coordination reciprocity at 2 time points 
mediating the relation between informational faultline strength and team performance, 







 Overall, Hypotheses 5 and 6 were not supported; only 1 step of the 4 steps was 
partially met, meaning that the hypothesized models were not supported.  Moreover, 
RMediation (Tofighi & MacKinnon, 2011) was used to test for indirect effects in these 
mediational models, because sometimes the distribution of an indirect effect is not 
normal.  The resulting confidence intervals from these calculations can be found in Table 
28, as well as visual depictions of the confidence intervals in Figures 65 through 72.  All 








RMediation Confidence Intervals for Testing Hypotheses 5-6 
 











5a a .20 .46 -.21 .34 b .14 .22 
5b a .29 .42 -.19 .43 b .21 .23 
Informational 
6a a .02 .02 -.01 .00 b -.02 .06 
6b a .02 .01 -.00 .00 b -.02 .07 
Later 
Social 
5a a .18 .64 -.24 .33 b .12 .16 
5b a -.03 1.36 -.78 .76 b .27 .07 
Informational 
6a a -.22 .00 -.20 .16 b .09 .41 






Figure 65.  RMediation confidence interval for early trust reciprocity mediating the 







Figure 66.  RMediation confidence interval for early coordination reciprocity mediating 







Figure 67.  RMediation confidence interval for early trust reciprocity mediating the 








Figure 68.  RMediation confidence interval for early coordination reciprocity mediating 








Figure 69.  RMediation confidence interval for later trust reciprocity mediating the 







Figure 70.  RMediation confidence interval for later coordination reciprocity mediating 







Figure 71.  RMediation confidence interval for later trust reciprocity mediating the 







Figure 72.  RMediation confidence interval for later coordination reciprocity mediating 







Post Hoc Power Analyses 
 Post hoc power analyses—the results of which are displayed in Table 29—were 
conducted in order to compute the achieved power.  These analyses were carried out 
because of the low observed effect sizes that resulted from testing Hypotheses 1 through 
6.  For an alpha level of .10, which was the alpha level used in the current study, the 
analyses testing Hypotheses 1 through 4 achieved power levels of .10 to .71, depending 
on the particular analysis.  Given that an acceptable level of power is .80 (Murphy, 
Myors, & Wolach, 2008), it is likely that low power may have prevented meaningful 








Post-Hoc Power Analysis Summary Statistics (α=.10) 
 







Faultline Strength Early Subgroup Trust Reciprocity .04 .27 
Faultline Strength Early Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity .10 .48 
Faultline Strength Later Subgroup Trust Reciprocity .03 .23 
Faultline Strength Later Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity .00 .10 
Faultline Strength Team Performance .10 .48 
Early Subgroup Trust Reciprocity Team Performance .12 .55 
Early Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity Team Performance .15 .62 
Later Subgroup Trust Reciprocity Team Performance .11 .51 








Faultline Strength Early Subgroup Trust Reciprocity .00 .10 
Faultline Strength Early Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity .00 .10 
Faultline Strength Later Subgroup Trust Reciprocity .05 .31 
Faultline Strength Later Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity .02 .19 
Faultline Strength Team Performance .14 .59 
Early Subgroup Trust Reciprocity Team Performance .14 .59 
Early Subgroup Coordination Reciprocity Team Performance .14 .59 
Later Subgroup Trust Reciprocity Team Performance .15 .62 








Previous research on team composition and performance has reported a rather 
weak relation between the two.  The current study adopted a relational, faultline 
perspective of team composition—as opposed to the traditional absolute view of 
demography—in order to investigate the potential functionality of faultlines as predictors 
of emergent trust and coordination in teams, as well as how these team processes serve to 
predict performance.  The veracity of these ideas was tested using a sample of 27 teams, 
composed of 226 participants total.  
The current study tested 6 hypotheses, none of which were fully supported.  First, 
faultline strength was not found to significantly impact subgroup reciprocity.  One 
explanation for this lack of findings is that the theoretical explanations provided for the 
hypotheses are incorrectly applied.  Hypotheses 1 and 2 suggested that groups with strong 
faultlines—and therefore more homogeneous subgroups—would be more likely to 
reciprocate trust and coordination ties at the subgroup level than groups with relatively 
weak faultlines.  These ideas were justified using the theories of homophily (McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001), intergroup bias (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002), 
similarity-attraction (Graves & Powell, 1995), and social categorization (Tajfel, 1982).  
However, it is possible that social and informational faultlines and subgroup trust and 
coordination reciprocity are unrelated concepts.  Hypothesis 3 put forth that social 
faultline strength would positively predict early subgroup trust and coordination 




informational faultline strength would positively predict later subgroup trust and 
coordination reciprocity more strongly than would social faultline strength.  However, the 
lack of findings associated with Hypothesis 3 does not discredit Harrison, Price, and 
Bell’s (1998) theory, which was used to explain the hypothesis, because the fundamental 
question of the hypothesis could not be tested due to nonsignificant findings from the first 
two hypotheses.  Hypothesis 4 stated that subgroup trust and coordination reciprocity 
would negatively predict team performance; this supposition was based on previous 
research on trust and coordination in teams (e.g., Costa, 2003; Tsai, 2002), as well as 
research on faultlines and performance (Thatcher & Patel, 2011).  Again, these 
hypothesized relations were not observed.  Hypotheses 5 and 6 put forth mediational 
relations based on the relations posited in the previous hypotheses, but were not 
supported due to the aforementioned lack of findings. 
Beyond potential theoretical issues that might account for the unimpressive results 
for Hypotheses 1 through 4, there are also statistical reasons.  It is likely that this sample 
had insufficient power to detect effects, due to small sample size and a priori and post 
hoc power analyses support this claim—see Tables 4, 5, and 29 for detailed summaries.  
Another statistical issue, which may explain the study’s results, is the use of faultline 
scores.  Although convincing evidence has been shown for the validity of faultline scores, 
contemporarily it is preferred to leave measurements in their original, absolute form, 
rather then subjecting them to score transformations.  By changing individual difference 
variables into faultline scores, potentially meaningful variance from the original variables 
is lost.  Contrasting relative, faultline criteria with absolute criteria could serve to 




coordination reciprocity relations, based on the subgroups created by the strongest social 
and informational faultline scores, may explain the lack of findings related to these 
variables.  Naturally occurring subgroup divisions would likely lead to more impressive 
findings than research-imposed fissions based on theory. 
Yet another possible explanation for the amount of nonsignificant findings is that 
the study targeted the wrong characteristics.  Perhaps age gender, narcissism, 
psychological collectivism, and area of functional expertise are not the particular 
variables that cause a small group to fracture.  Another possibility is the potential 
faultlines that were calculated were not activated.  Faultline activation, or the faultline 
split being perceived by the individuals in the group, was not measured, so it is 
impossible to know if these hypothetical divisions had any effect on group processes 
from the perspectives of the group members themselves.  An additional possibility is that 
the teams were divided into subgroups, but there were more than 2 of them; this study 
only considered scenarios where the group was divided into 2 component subgroups.  
This is problematic is some ways; for instance, it does not allow for individuals to cleanly 
divide into their 3 functional expertise teams, which may have been the case. 
Limitations 
 The most prominent limitation of this study is the low sample size.  As 
demonstrated through power analyses, this low sample size led to very low power in all 
cases of team-level analyses, and most likely resulted in effects not being detected.  In 
addition, the teams were relatively short-lived; perhaps relations would be more 
pronounced in a sample measured for longer than 8 weeks, and if relations were 




employed a sample of college students, a group of people that is not necessarily reflective 
of the general population, especially in terms of some individual difference variables 
such as intelligence.  Furthermore, this study may be limited in terms of generalizability 
because of the high levels of virtual interaction, and very low average levels of face-to-
face interaction, that took place between participants, which are not reflective of how 
people actually tend to interact. Finally, this study is limited by the common method bias, 
and the fact that all data is based on self-report. 
Implications for Theory and Directions for Future Research 
 This study takes an important step in terms of further merging faultline research 
and network analysis, 2 areas that could mutually benefit from each other theoretically 
and methodologically, but have yet to truly do so.  Future research on faultlines should 
investigate at a variety of different individual different variables that may lead to faultline 
splits. In addition, prospective faultline studies should measure faultline activation, and 
should take into account the possibility of faultlines splitting a group into more than two 
component subgroups.  Researchers should specifically investigate the effect of 
informational faultlines on performance, based on the finding of this study that—in 
certain circumstances—reciprocity networks bifurcated by strongest informational 
faultlines predict group performance.  Studying informational in addition to social 
faultlines is particularly important because of the overwhelming preference of past 
researchers for the latter.  Moreover, future research should endeavor to longitudinally 
assess global virtual teams on an even broader scale, and should attempt to measure 
variables of interest using multiple different methods over a substantial period of time.  




faultlines and resulting subgroups, such as Carton and Cummings’ (2012) identity-based, 
resource-based, and knowledge-based subgroups. 
Conclusion 
Figuring out the relationship between faultlines and team processes and 
performance is the perfect problem space for employing network analytic theory and 
methodology.  This study explored this relatively untouched area of research using a 
sample of cross-functional, cross-national multiteam systems.  Future research can use 
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